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LIABILITY OF INNKEEFR FOR UHATELS OF GUESTS
THE LLABILITY OF AN INNKEEPER FOR THE PER-
SONAL CHATTELS OF HIS GUESTS.
At common law an innkeeper was liable for the goods of
his guest lost in an inn, unless the loss was caused by an
Act of God, a public enemy or by the fault of the guest.
lie was regarded as an insurer of his guest's goods. This is
the prevailing view today, it being the law in a majority
of the states. Arkansas,' California,2 Delaware,8 Mfaine,'
Mlassachusetts, 5 Nebraska, s New HampshireJ New York,8
Ohio, 9 West Virginia,10 Wisconsin," Alabama, 12 North Caro-
lina 8 and Pennsylvania" have followed this common law
doctrine. The courts of these various states have construed
an "Act of God" differently. In Hulett v. Swift 14 it was
held that an innkeeper was liable for goods lost due to an
accidental fire, while in Moore v. Long Beach Development
Clo.,6 the court decided that an innkeeper was immune from
liability for an accidental fire. In Schiffer v. Carson17 it
was held that an innkeeper who negligently failed to pro-
vide against an "Act of God" was liable. The New York
view is the broader and the one generally followed in this
country.
1. Petit v. Thomas, 103 ArFi. 593.
2. Matier v. Brown, 1 Calif. 221.
3. Russell v. Pagan, 7 Houst. 389.
4. Norcross v. Norcross, 53 Me. 163.
5. Mason v. Thompson, 9 Pick. 280.
6. Dunbler v. Day, 12 Nebr. 596.
7. Sibley v. Aldrich, 33 N. H. 553.
8. Hulett v. Swift, 33 N. Y. 571.
9. Gast v. Gooding, 1 Ohio Dec. 315.
10. Cunningham v. Buckey, 42 W. Va. 671.
11. Jalie v. Cardinal, 35 Wis. 118.
12. Glenn v. Jackson, 93 Ala. 342.
13. Halstein v. Phillips, 146 N. C. 366.
14. Schultz v. Wall, 134 Pa. St. 262.
15. 33 N. Y. 571.
16. 87 Cal. 483.
17. 5 S. Dak. 233.
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Another doctrine which has been adopted to some extent
is that an innkeeper is liable only if he is negligent. The
courts of Illinois,28 Indiana,' Kentucky, 20 Louisiana,2' Mary-
land,22 Michigan,23 Texas 24 and South Carolina28 have held
to this opinion.
There is still a third, the prevailing English view,26 which
has been adhered to by Minnesota 27 and Vermont,28 which
is that the. innkeeper is liable if injury was the result of an
inevitable accident or an irresistible force. Thus the courts
have held that a robbery or burglary may discharge him if
he was not at fault. This rule is really a lenient gloss on
the first mentioned doctrine, and is best in accord with the
history of the law. Whatever view is taken the burden of
proof is on the innkeeper to establish facts which will ex-
onerate him.
The next question that naturally arises is concerning the
kind of chattels of his guest for which the innkeeper is
liable. As a general rule he is liable for all goods that he has
received. He can refuse to accept any specific article, but
if he does accept, he at once becomes liable. This rule has
many exceptions and is regulated by statutes in most juris-
dictions. At common law he was liable for all the money
in the possession of his guests. However, this rule has been
abrogated to a great extent. Thus in Johnson v. Richard-
son,20 the court held that an innkeeper's liability will not
embrace sums of money which no prudent man would carry
with him where exchange can readily be obtained. Again in
18. Johnson v. Richardson, 17 Ill. 302.
19. Baker v. Dessauer, 49 Ind. 28.
20. Vance v. Throckmorton, 5 Bush 41.
21. Woodworth v. Morse, 18 La. Ann. 156.
22. Towson v. Bank, 6 Har. & J. 47.
23. Cutler v. Bonney, 30 Mich. 255.
24. Howth v. Franklin, 20 Tex. 978.
25. Axon v. Newsom, 1 McCord, 509.
26. Morgan v. Ravey, 6 H. & N. 265.
27. Olson v. Crossman, 31 Minn. 222.
28. Howe Mach. Co. v. Pease, 49 Vt. 477.
29. 17 Ill. 302.
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Profilet v. Hall8 0 it was decided that an innkeeper was not
liable for baggage or for money for immediate expenses
unless it was deposited with the innkeeper. Most states
have statutes to the same effect as the above case.
Some courts have gone as far as to restrict the articles
for which an innkeeper is liable. In Neal v. Wilcox31 it was
held that his liability was restricted to such goods and ani-
mals as a guest has with him for the purpose of his journey.
Thus a mule brought by a guest and placed in a pasture near-
by did not bind the innkeeper.
The word "baggage" has always caused a great amount
of litigation concerning its meaning, because in many juris-
dictions the liability depends upon whether or not the article
comes under the definition. If the article comes under this
definition it is not necessary for the plaintiff to prove negli-
gence to make the innkeeper liable. Baggage is generally
defined to be those articles necessary for the personal use of
the guest during the journey, and not for exhibition or sale.
In Pettigrew v. Barnm,Y 2 silver knives, forks and spoons
were not considered to be baggage, and in Giles v. Fauntle-
roy3" it did not include surgical instruments or pistols. Again
in Myers v. Cottrilla the court held as follows: If a person
going into a hotel as a guest takes to his room not ordinary
baggage or those articles which generally accompany the
traveler, but valuable merchandise such as watches and
jewelry, and keeps them for show or sale, and from time to
time invites parties to his room to inspect and to purchase;
unless there is some special circumstance in the case show-
ing that the innkeeper assumes his responsibility as of
ordinary baggage; as to such merchandise the special obli-
gations imposed by the common law do not exist, and the
guest as to those goods becomes their vendor and uses his
30. 14 La. Ann. 524.
31. 49 N. C. 146.
32. 11 Md. 434.
33. 13 Md. 126.
34. 5 Bliss 465.
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room for the sale of merchandise, he changes the ordinary
relation of host and guest, and thus the innkeeper is not
liable.
In Williams v. Hardware Co.,85 a mueh later case, it was
held that when property is brought to a hotel for the pur-
pose of sale or show, such as the goods of a commercial
traveler, the innkeeper is only held to the exercise of ordi-
nary care and answerable only for negligence. This case
shows the tendency of the modern view which holds the
innkeeper liable only for his negligence, while the former
case discharges him of all liability.
Practically all of the states have statutes that limit the
liability of the innkeeper to the conformance of certain rules
by the guest, such as leaving valuable packages in the
office or safe; the failure on part of the guest will exonerate
the innkeeper 0 These required articles must be within
reason, and not such articles as are essential to personal
needs. Thus clothing and articles of daily use are not cov-
ered by this rule.3 7  The guest must have reasonable notice
of such a regulation and it is the duty of the innkeeper to
inform him. In Brown Hotel Co. v. Burchard,38 the inn-
keeper informed the guest that "valuables" must be put in
the safe. The court held that it was not definite enough
to apply to mineral specimens which were not placed in the
safe and as a result subsequently were lost.
Another way by which the liability of an innkeeper is
limited is by the contributory negligence of the guest. This
negligence need not be gross, but must be a direct and proxi-
mate cause of the loss.3 9 In an action of this type where
the point of contributory negligence is raised by the inn-
keeper, courts generally require a weighty proof on his
part, as the contributory negligence alleged must be at the
35. 29 Okla. 331.
36. Stanton v. Leland, 4 E. D. Smith (N. Y.) 88.
37. Johnson v. Richardson, 17 Ill. 302.
38. 13 Colo. App. 59.
39. Lanier v. Youngblood, 73 Ala. 587.
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time of the loss, not before or after.40 Thus a failure to lock
a bedroom door is not negligence on the part of the guest,41
and also a failure to notify innkeeper that the door lock is
broken is not negligence.4 2 Again we find in Dernbier v.
Day, 3 that when a guest who took out a large amount of
money in the hotel lobby for the purpose of counting it and
was consequently robbed, the innkeeper was discharged from
liability as he was not guilty of negligence.
When does the innkeeper's liability commence? The gen-
eral rule is that it commences from the moment that the
relation of host and guest is established, until the time that
this relation terminates. However there is some authority
to the effect that the innkeeper's liability commences before
the relation of host and guest commences. In Dickinson v.
Winchester,"4 it was held that an arrangement by a bag-
gage transfer company to haul a guest's baggage to the
inn, places the liability on the innkeeper when the transfer
company takes possession. The modern view tends to place
,liability on the innkeeper only when the above relation is
established. This is shown in Hirsh v. American Hotel
Co.,4 where a traveling salesman forwarded his trunk to a
hotel twelve days before his arrival and the trunk was de-
posited in the baggage room, the location of which was
known to the traveler; the hotel proprietor was merely a
gratuitous bailee and was not liable in the absence of proof
of gross negligence for the contents of the trunk removed
while in the baggage room. In such a case the relation of
guest and innkeeper did not arise until the actual arrival
of the owner of the trunk at the hotel.
At common law, an innkeeper was liable for the safe
keeping of his guest's goods from the time that they were
40. Burrow v. Trieber, 21 Md. 320.
41. Classen v. Leopold, 2 Sweeny (N. Y.) 705.
42. Lanier v. Youngblood, 73 Ala. 587.
43. 12 Nebr. 596.
44. 4 Cash (Mass.) 114.
45. 58 Pa. Super. Ct., 38.
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brought within the precincts of the inn. Thus in a ease
where the plaintiff gave trunk checks to a bell boy, on
nondelivery of the trunks, the innkeeper was held liable.
40
In Minor v. Staples,47 it was held that an innkeeper was not
liable where a guest placed his goods in a bathing house out-
side of the inn. This case, while differing from the majority
view, can easily be reconciled, due to its facts, However,
if the innkeeper directs that the goods be kept outside of
the inn, he is liable for their loss.,8 The weight of authority
holds to the above first mentioned rule. We find in Eden v,
Dieg,49 where the goods of an intending guest were sent to
an inn without knowledge of innkeeper, and the transfer
company placed the goods on a platform of the inn and
shouted "baggage," the innkeeper was liable for the sub-
sequent loss. However, a person must become a guest or
show his intention within a reasonable time after the de-
livery of his baggage to the transfer company.
If the guest retains possession of his goods, it is neces-
sary that he keep them under his general control. In Vance
v. Throckmorton, 0 it was held that when in the absence of
the innkeeper, a guest took the key and undertook to look
out for himself, the innkeeper was not liable. And again in
Neal v. Wilcox,5 where a horse of a guest was pastured in a
field belonging to the innkeeper, but was taken care of by
the owner, the innkeeper was not liable.
Another interesting question that arises is the status of
host and guest after the relation has ceased. This relation
does not cease when a guest temporarily absents himself
from the inn. In Hays v. Turner," it was held that where
a guest goes out of the inn to see the town, intending to
return before night, the relation continues, and in Lynar v.
46. Keith v. Atkinson, 48 Colo. 480,
47. 71 Me. 316.
48. Cohen v. Manuel, 91 Me. 274,
49. 75 Ill. App. 102.
50. 5 Bush. (Ky.) 41.
51. 49 N. C. 146.
52. 23 Iowa 214.
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llossap53 we find that where a traveler hired a room to dress
in, dressed and departed from the inn, the innkeeper was
not liable for the loss of his goods, as he had no knowledge
that he intended to return.
After a guest pays his bill and departs, leaving goods
to be removed, the innkeeper is liable for the goods for a
reasonable time pending removal. Thus where an innkeep-
er's servants, after guest had left, promised to deliver bag-
gage to a certain railroad station, the innkeeper was held
liable for the subsequent loss.51 However, if guest departs,
and leaves goods to be kept until called for, innkeeper is
only a gratuitous bailee..  Also if an innkeeper receives
goods after guest has departed, intending to forward them,
le is only liable as a bailee, as the relation of guest and host
has ceased.5
The Missouri statutes on this subject are in effect that no
innkeeper shall be liable for any loss of any property of a
guest in a total sum greater than $200, unless innkeeper by
an agreement in writing shall assume greater liability, and
the innkeeper shall not be liable unless goods are delivered
to innkeeper and acknowledged by a claim check, unless the
damage or loss occur through the willful negligence of the
innkeeper, and a copy of the statute should be placed in ev-
ery guest's room.5 7 The innkeeper shall not be liable for the
loss of any merchandise for sale, or samples belonging to
the guest, unless a special written agreement is entered into.8
All the eases in the Missouri courts have been construed
accordingly and as a rule follow the generally accepted lines
described above.
DIKRA-T C. SEROPYANT, '26.
53. 36 L. B. 230.
54. Lassen v. Clark, 37 Ga. 242.
55. Hays v. Turner, 28 Iowa 214.
56. Murray v. Marshall, 9 Colo. 492.
57. R. S. Mo. 1919, Sec. 68OG (Amend. 192f).
58. R. S. Mo. 1910, gec. 58C6.
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